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ABSTRACT
Political pressure in the United States is again building to constrain pharmaceutical prices either
directly or through legalized reimportation of lower-priced pharmaceuticals from foreign countries.
This study uses the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural
experiment to show how threats of price constraints affect firm-level R&D spending. We link events
surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical company stock price changes and then examine the cross-
sectional relation between the stock price changes and subsequent unexpected R&D spending
changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on firm stock prices and R&D
spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by $1.6 billion, even though it never
became law. If the HSA had passed, and had many small firms not raised capital just prior to the
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  Can proposed government policy that significantly affects the stock prices of research 
and  development  (R&D)  intensive  firms  affect  their  R&D  spending  decisions?  The  Clinton 
Administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) provides a natural experiment to study this issue 
because  it  never  passed  Congress  but  nonetheless  caused  significant  stock  price  declines  for 
pharmaceutical firms. This study investigates the effects that price constraints proposed in the 
HSA had on pharmaceutical stock prices and subsequent firm-level R&D spending. 
The  link  from  R&D  to  stock  prices  has  been  studied  by  Chan,  Lakonishok,  and 
Sougiannis (2001) and Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique (2004), but neither considers the link 
from stock prices to subsequent R&D spending. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find a link 
from stock price changes to investment spending, so there could be a similar link from stock 
prices to comparatively flexible R&D spending. If investors expected the HSA to reduce the 
value of pharmaceutical R&D, then firms’ stock prices should fall, and managers could respond 
by reducing  R&D spending, at least in the short-run. 
Ellison and Mullin (2001) have linked the ferocious political debate on the HSA to the 
extremely poor stock returns for pharmaceutical firms during 1992-1993. They find that their 
sample of 18 large pharmaceutical company stocks suffered an average 38 percent loss during the 
period (-52 percent risk-adjusted). We find similar negative returns, but for a wider variety of 111 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. More important, we show that the higher the R&D 
intensity, the larger the loss, with top quartile firms losing 60 percent on average (93 percent risk 
adjusted).  
After illustrating how the HSA had significant effects on pharmaceutical stock prices, 
particularly those of R&D intensive firms, we consider whether pharmaceutical firms responded 
by reducing their subsequent R&D spending. To study this issue, we need to link the HSA more 
closely to firms’ stock price declines and then link those declines to their R&D spending. We do 
not claim that the HSA caused all of the cumulative declines in pharmaceutical stock prices 
during  1992-1993.  Nevertheless,  industry  executives  claim  that  the  HSA  marked  the  start  of   4 
constant  political  pressure  to  monitor  and  contain  average  drug  prices,
1  and  since  then, 
pharmaceutical price inflation has received much attention
2. Therefore, although the total effect 
of the HSA alone may be uncertain, we show that a few surprise events closely associated with it 
had significant negative effects on pharmaceutical stock prices. Furthermore, we show that firms’ 
abnormal returns surrounding the events are positively related to their subsequent R&D spending 
changes. 
  The notion that product pricing or profitability is positively related to R&D spending 
seems straightforward. In one of the few precise studies of this issue, Finkelstein (2004) shows 
that exogenous government policies used to boost particular vaccines’ profitability led to greater 
R&D spending on those vaccines. Acemolgu and Linn (2005) suggest that pharmaceutical R&D 
responds  to  the  exogenous  demographic  changes  driving  revenues.  But  a  positive  relation 
between  R&D  spending  and  profit  is  not  a  foregone  conclusion.  Ellison  and  Mullin  (2001) 
suggest that the HSA caused a pure wealth transfer from pharmaceutical firms to consumers, and 
that stock price declines might not lead to reduced R&D spending.  
  At the industry level, studies by Scherer (2001), Vernon (2005, 2003), and Giaccotto, 
Santerre, and Vernon (2005) show that policies designed to lower average pharmaceutical prices 
lead to lower R&D spending. At the company level, Lichtenberg (2004) uses a sample of 46 
pharmaceutical firms to identify a time series cross-sectional link between pharmaceutical stock 
price changes and R&D spending during 1953-1996. He conjectures that the HSA could have 
caused the significant pharmaceutical stock price declines in 1993, and the subsequent industry-
                                                 
1 We thank Jean Paul Gagnon of Aventis, Y. Richard Wang of AstraZeneca, and Richard Manning of 
Pfizer for this insight. After the HSA, examples or indirect pressure on pharmaceutical prices includes 
discounts required on pharmaceuticals supplied to Medicaid and Veterans Administration and 
reimportation of pharmaceuticals from price regulated countries. Tessoriero (2004) suggests that political 
pressure can be observed in the year before presidential elections when pharmaceutical price increases tend 
to be subdued. 
2 A search of the Wall Street Journal confirms this. Average drug price inflation is discussed in only three 
articles from 1984 until 1992. During the HSA event period of 1992-1993, 12 such articles appeared, and 
from 1994 through 2005, 42 articles appeared. Therefore, the 1992-1993 HSA event period can be viewed 
generally as the time when the industry, and stock investors, realized that pharmaceutical pricing would be 
more politicized if not federally regulated.   5 
level R&D spending growth declines in 1994 and 1995. But he does not measure firm-specific 
HSA-related returns, nor does he isolate the relation between those returns and firm-level R&D 
spending during these years. 
Our  study  focuses  on  this  cross-sectional  relation  during  1993-1995.  It  attempts  to 
account for the differential effects that an exogenous government policy (the HSA) could have on 
firms’ R&D portfolio values, and consequently, their stock prices. We expect the most vulnerable 
firms to have large R&D portfolios as a proportion of firm value, but also those with more 
marginal R&D projects. To measure firms’ marginal R&D projects, we employ the real options 
perspective.  Marginal  projects  are  equivalent  to  leveraged  assets,  hence,  we  measure  R&D 
leverage using firms’ betas. Results show that beta levels and HSA-induced changes help to 
explain changes in firms’ stock prices and R&D spending.  
Ellison and Mullin (2001) claim that the HSA should not affect R&D spending because 
most  drug  prices  include  large  economic  rents.  The  HSA  simply  reallocated  rents.  This  is 
equivalent to assuming that drug R&D options are mostly low-risk and deep in-the-money. But 
our  analysis  shows  that  R&D  intensive,  high  risk  firms  experience  relatively  large  negative 
returns. Many of them are biotech firms. A sharp drop in external financing available to biotech 
firms after the HSA, documented by Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003), is consistent with the sharp 
declines in their stock prices. It is also consistent with our finding that risk effects are driven by 
firm liquidity. Firms that have accumulated significant liquidity are likely to be planning more 
projects, and could continue to spend on R&D, even in the face of price regulation. Consequently, 
they are particularly vulnerable to the HSA and their stock prices could fall more. 
Overall, we find that firms responded to declines in their stock prices by reducing their 
R&D expenditures below expected levels. R&D spending was lower by 5.3 percent in 1994, 
which is equivalent to a drop of $508 million ($1.02 billion) measured in 1983 (2004) dollars. If 
the HSA had passed, and had many biotech firms not raised significant amounts of capital just 
before the HSA, the change in R&D spending could have been much greater.   6 
This paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly discusses the HSA and how it could 
affect the R&D spending behavior of a range of firms distinguished by R&D intensity, risk, and 
liquidity. Testable hypotheses are proposed. Section II describes the data and presents a graphical 
view  of  the  HSA’s  effects  on  stock  prices.  Section  III  presents  a  model  of  expected  R&D 
spending intensity, and tests the relation between HSA-related abnormal returns and firm-level 
R&D intensity and risk. It also tests the relation between subsequent unexpected R&D spending 
intensity and HSA-related abnormal returns and risk changes. Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
I. The HSA and Its Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Stock Prices and R&D Spending  
 
  To more precisely link the HSA to changes in firm value and risk, Section A discusses 
the  particular  parts  of  the  act  that  were  most  relevant  to  pharmaceutical  firms.  Section  B 
characterizes pharmaceutical firms in ways that help guide the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
A. HSA Price Control Threats 
Ellison and Mullin (2001) provide a detailed analysis of the events surrounding the HSA 
and describe its major provisions. Proposed universal coverage for outpatient drugs was a positive 
for pharmaceutical firms, but proposed purchasing groups, restrictive formularies, drug utilization 
reviews, and generic substitution would likely offset the benefits of universal coverage. They 
contend that the most important provision for pharmaceutical firms, also modeled by Abbott 
(1995), was price limits on new breakthrough drugs.  
Grabowski and Vernon (1990) show that breakthrough drugs must earn large profits in 
order to cover the combined R&D costs of many drugs that are never marketed. For the purposes 
of our study, this means that the proposed price limits on breakthrough drugs would likely cut the 
value  of  firms’  R&D  assets.  In  particular,  firms  with  high  R&D  exposures  (e.g.,  small   7 
biotechnology firms) could be expected to experience relatively large stock price changes and 
R&D spending changes. 
Ellison and Mullin (2001) argue convincingly that the HSA was a serious threat to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and that it accounted for the large negative returns experienced by the 
industry during 1992-1993. The industry believed that the HSA could be so ruinous that 21 large 
firms  pledged  to  keep  their  price  increases  below  consumer  inflation  in  order  to  convince 
Congress that the legislation was not necessary
3. But these large firms are not the most R&D 
intensive and the bulk of our sample of firms did not pledge to stifle their price increases.  
Price controls can affect more than just expected future profitability. They can reduce 
expected future return volatility, as is common for price-regulated utilities. Of course, because the 
HSA was not enacted, the events surrounding it could have simply created greater uncertainty 
about  future  pharmaceutical  prices,  increasing  firm  risk.  Therefore,  we  also  study  the  cross-
sectional effects of the HSA on firm risk; both systematic and total risk. We study how the levels 
(and changes) of firm risk during the period are related to stock price changes and subsequent 
R&D spending changes.  
 
B. Expected Effects of the HSA on Stock Returns and Risk 
The firms in the pharmaceutical industry are traditionally characterized as generic, brand-
name, or biotech (pure research). This study, however, characterizes firms by the relative sizes of 
the market values of their component parts. We assume that the total market value of a firm, VT, is 
composed of three parts; the value of its marketed drugs, VD (assets in place), the value of its 
R&D  portfolio,  VR  (growth  opportunities),  and  the  value  of  its  net  liquid  assets,  VL.  The 
systematic risk (βT) of the firm is a weighted average of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
betas of the three assets: 
                                                 
3 The Department of Justice ruled that the pledge was illegal and the Federal Trade Commission claimed 
that the firms were fixing prices.   8 
βT = WL βL + WD βD + WR βR,                (1) 
where βL,, βD, and βR are betas of the three assets and the weights are WL = VL/VT , WD = VD/VT , 
and WR = VR/VT.  In this formulation, the R&D exposure of a firm is given by the product of its 
R&D intensity, WR, and sensitivity, βR. (For a more formal presentation, see Appendix A.) 
Because the proposed HSA mostly affected the pricing of future drug discoveries, the 
HSA should have primarily affected firms’ R&D portfolio values, VR. And those values can be 
described as real options. Schwartz (2004) models an R&D project as a call option, and shows 
how government regulation can affect its value. The expected HSA effects can be described by 
how price limits for future drugs affect the expected return and risk of a call option.  
The underlying asset price, S, of an R&D option is the present value of expected future 
cash flows from a new drug. Drug price constraints will reduce a drug’s future cash flows, but not 
the expected production and marketing costs, X. This will reduce the in-the-moneyness (S – X), 
and hence the value of, an R&D call option. Further, the final passage of price regulation could 
lower asset return volatility, although the intervening legislative debate and uncertainty about the 
passage of the proposed reforms would have the opposite effect on short-run return volatility. The 
more R&D options a firm holds as a proportion of its total assets, the higher the R&D intensity 
and the greater the HSA’s expected affect. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, the stock price response to HSA-related news releases will 
be negatively related to a pharmaceutical firm’s R&D intensity. 
 
Since  the  true  R&D  intensity,  WR,  is  not  observable,  we  will  use  an  accounting 
(historical)  variable  to  capture  the  R&D  intensity  of  pharmaceutical  firms.  Following  Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001), we will proxy for WR by capitalizing a firm’s R&D spending   9 
over five years
4. In addition, we will use two market-based measures that influence WR: the pre-
HSA stock return volatility, σi, and the change in volatility during the HSA event period, ∆σi. The 
R&D option value is increasing in both σi and ∆σi. Because high-volatility increases the expected 
in-the-moneyness of R&D options, we expect the price response of firms with high pre-event σi 
to be less sensitive to the proposed HSA news. Therefore, we expect the stock price response to 
be positively related to the pre-event stock volatility and the event-induced change in volatility.  
The second important component of R&D exposure is the beta of the R&D assets, βR. We 
know that the values of R&D options that are well in-the-money (S >> X) will be less sensitive to 
the HSA price threats. In contrast, marginal projects (i.e., those projects for which the R&D asset 
value, S, is close to the cost of production facilities, X) will be more sensitive to proposed price 
constraints. A firm composed of mostly at-the-money or out-of-the-money R&D projects should 
have a relatively high βT, and be more vulnerable to the HSA price threats. Galai and Masulis 
(1976) show how option beta is affected by changes in the underlying asset price. Notice that the 
level of firm βR (and in turn βT) measures its R&D leverage and should be negatively associated 
with S. Although the moneyness and βR of a firm’s R&D options are not observable, the R&D 
sensitivity can be partly inferred from a firm’s pre-event stock beta, βi, and the change in beta 
during the HSA event period, ∆βi. Essentially, the HSA price  threats reduce  moneyness and 
increase beta of the R&D call option. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, the stock price response to HSA price regulation threats will 
be negatively related to a firm’s pre-event equity beta and the event-induced beta change. 
 
                                                 
4 Their specification for capitalized R&D (CRD) for company i in year t is  
 
  CRDi,t = RDi,t + 0.8*RDi,t-1 + 0.6*RDi,t-2 + 0.4*RDi,t-3 + 0.2*RDi,t-4 , 
 
where RDi,t-i is R&D expense for year t-i , i = 0 to 4.   10 
Hypothesis  2  simply  observes  that  marginal  R&D  projects,  like  out-of-the-money 
options, are more levered, making them riskier and more sensitive to the negative HSA effects.  
  Our  first  empirical  model  tests  these  hypotheses  using  cross-sectional  data  measured 
around the HSA. 
 
CARi = b0 + bi(CRDTAi) + b2(βi) + b3(∆βi) + b4(σi) + b5(∆σi) + εi.    (2) 
 
 
  CARi  (cumulative  abnormal  return)  measures  firm  i’s  stock  market  value  reaction  to 
surprise announcements associated with the HSA. R&D intensity (CRDTAi) is the capitalized 
value of firm i’s R&D spending divided by its total assets (following Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Sougiannis (2001)). βi and σi are firm i’s beta and return volatility, respectively, measured before 
the HSA. ∆βi and ∆σi are changes in these variables during the HSA event period. Hypothesis 1 
implies bi < 0, b4 > 0 and b5 > 0. Hypothesis 2 implies b2 < 0 and b3 < 0.  
There are a number of potentially confounding issues to consider. The most important of 
these is that R&D beta is unobservable, so that it has been assumed that equity beta mirrors R&D 
beta. This is a reasonable assumption if firm value is largely composed of marketed drugs and 
R&D projects. But when the ratio of liquid assets, L, to total assets varies significantly across 
firms, the cross-section of equity betas and beta changes is less likely to accurately reflect R&D 
betas and beta changes. The same is true for volatility and volatility changes. Fixing R&D beta 
and R&D return volatility, greater liquid assets imply smaller equity beta, volatility, beta changes, 
and volatility changes. To account for these effects, βi, σi, ∆βi, and ∆σi are interacted with liquid 
assets, L, and the interaction variables are added to (2).  
Moreover, pharmaceutical firms with long and deep R&D pipelines tend to accumulate 
(excessive) liquid resources to fund those projects in the future. In a sense, liquid assets reflect 
future R&D expenditures (and intensity) of the firm. High values of the interaction terms (βi x L)   11 
and (∆βi x L) represent firms that have proportionally more marginal future R&D projects. Since 
such  projects  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  proposed  HSA  price  caps,  we  expect  the 
coefficients associated with these interaction terms to have negatives signs. On the other hand, 
high values of the interaction terms (σi x L) and (∆σi x L) represent firms that have more volatile 
future R&D projects. So we expect their coefficients to be positive. 
Liquidity can have behavioral effects as well as purely technical effects. In particular, 
managers could blunt the measured effects of the HSA if they cut back on R&D spending since 
many R&D projects will require much future spending. But Jensen (1986) suggests that firm 
managers  with  freely  available  cash  may  not  act  in  the  firm’s  best  interest,  and  Guedji  and 
Scharfstein (2004) show that high-cash biotech firms often overspend on R&D. With respect to 
the HSA, liquidity provides managers with the financial slack to continue R&D spending even if 
threatened price regulation makes the expected value of some R&D spending negative. Therefore, 
liquidity could enhance the negative (positive) effects of βi and ∆βi  (σi and ∆σi) on CAR.  
  Other confounding issues are possible, but we believe less likely. The HSA proposed 
extended prescription coverage, hence, R&D intensive firms could benefit from greater expected 
unit sales. But Coulson and Stuart (1995) show that the demand for pharmaceuticals is price 
inelastic,  making  it  unlikely  that  the  decrease  in  profit  per  unit  could  be  made  up  in  larger 
volumes. Heavy lobbying by pharmaceutical firms against the HSA implies that they expected 
significant negative effects.  
Cross-sectional variation in firm financial leverage could also account for variation in 
CAR. We consider this possibility by adding a leverage (control) variable to (2). 
Finally, we also consider whether the brand-name drug firms that voluntarily constrained 
their price increases prior to the HSA suffered relatively large stock price declines. HSA passage 
could have forced them to make their pledge more permanent than the market expected. In this 
case, CAR and a binary variable identifying price constrained firms should be negatively related.   12 
Alternatively, because the firms constrained prices before the HSA events, the effect of those 
events on them could be diluted. 
  Model (2) establishes the drivers of firms’ stock price reactions to the HSA. Our second 
model tests whether firm managers, in turn, changed their R&D spending in response to HSA-
induced changes in stock prices (CAR) and risk (∆βi and ∆σi). Negative CARs imply that investors 
believed that a firm’s R&D options values were more likely to fall below their R&D expenses. 
Managers should react by cutting R&D spending, either because they also believe some marginal 
projects are no longer worthwhile, or because they respond to signals sent by investors through 
stock prices. Similarly, managers could react to changes in their stocks’ risk levels. A large ∆βi 
implies that a firm has more marginal R&D projects, so that managers should cut R&D spending 
more. Conversely, a large ∆σi implies larger R&D options values, and managers should increase 
spending. These arguments lead to: 
 
Hypothesis 3: All else equal, unexpected R&D spending is positively related to CAR and ∆σi, but 
negatively related to ∆βi. 
 
  The second empirical model tests this hypothesis.   
 
URDTAi,t+1  = b0 + b1(CARi,t) + b2(∆βi,t) + b3(∆σi,t ) + εi,t+1.    (3) 
 
 
  Unexpected  R&D  (URDTAi)  is  firm  i’s  unexpected  R&D  spending  in  the  post-HSA 
period as a proportion of its total assets. It is a residual from a model that estimates normal or 
expected R&D spending intensity (discussed in the next section). Hypothesis 3 implies b1 > 0, b2 
< 0, and b3 > 0.   13 
There are again some potentially confounding issues to consider. As in (2), ∆βi and ∆σi 
proxy  for  changes  in  R&D  beta  and  volatility,  respectively.  Cross-sectional  variation  in  the 
proportion  of  liquid  assets  causes  beta  change  (volatility  change)  to  deviate  from  R&D  beta 
change  (volatility  change).  The  issue  is  handled  by  interacting  liquidity  with  beta  change 
(volatility change) and adding interaction variables to (3).  
The free cash flow problem discussed in Jensen (1986), and empirically supported by 
Guedji and Scharfstein (2004) for biotech firms, is potentially more problematic in model (3) than 
in model (2). Model (3) purports to explain managers’ R&D spending reactions to the HSA. 
Liquid assets provide managers with financial slack at a time when Lerner, Shane, and Tsai 
(2003) show that external financing for biotech firms had dropped sharply. They also show that 
some firms raised funds just before the HSA. This means that financial slack could vary cross-
sectionally. Managers with adequate funds may not change their R&D spending, even if their 
firm’s  stock  price,  beta,  and  volatility  change  significantly.  As  a  consequence,  the  relations 
posited in (3) may not hold. 
Finally, we again account for the brand-name drug firms that voluntarily constrained 
price  increases  around  the  HSA.  These  firms  may  have  cut  R&D  more  than  other  firms  in 
response  to  the  HSA.  Therefore,  a  variable  identifying  price  constrained  firms  should  be 
negatively related to URDTAi. Alternatively, because the firms pledged to constrain their prices 
before the HSA-related events, the effect on post HSA R&D could be negligible.  
 
II. The Data, the Sample, and a Graphical Illustration of HSA Effects 
A. The data and the sample 
  The study employs financial accounting data and stock market data for each sample firm 
around  the  period  of  1992-1993,  when  the  events  associated  with  the  HSA  occurred.  The 
accounting  data,  such  as  annual  R&D  expenditures,  are  obtained  from  Standard  and  Poor’s 
Compustat database. The stock market data, such as daily firm stock returns, are obtained from   14 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This limits the potential sample because both 
Compustat  and  CRSP  cover  few  foreign  firms.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the  largest  foreign 
pharmaceutical firms with significant operations in the U.S. are covered in our sample.  
  The sample selection process is structured to be inclusive. Unlike earlier studies, we do 
not focus solely on large firms. The process starts with all firms on Compustat with a North 
American  Industry  Classification  System  (NAICS)  code  of  either  325412  (Pharmaceutical 
Preparation Manufacturing) or 325414 (Biological Product Manufacturing). Included firms must 
have data available for at least the years 1991-1995. This selection process results in 176 firms. 
Of  these  176  firms,  113 also  have  stock  returns  on  the  CRSP  database  covering  the  period. 
Finally, of these 113, only two have less then eight years of accounting data on Compustat. We 
eliminate these firms because they do not have enough data to allow us to reliably estimate their 
expected R&D spending using the model discussed below. Of the remaining 111, only one has 
eight years, two have nine years, and all of the others have at least 10 years of data, including the 
1991-1995 period. 
  The  study  revolves  around  the  effects  of  the  HSA  on  companies’  R&D  spending 
decisions. This requires a standardized measure of R&D spending that allows comparisons across 
time and across firms of different sizes. We considered the ratio of R&D spending to a firm’s 
total assets (RDTA) and the ratio of R&D spending to a firm’s total sales (RDS). We selected 
RDTA because it gives more reasonable figures for the firms in our sample. RDS gives extreme 
values for those firms with little revenue. We rejected excluding these firms because this would 
bias the sample toward more established, low R&D-intensive firms. 
Appendix B lists the 111 firms in our sample sorted by RDTA from lowest to highest and 
separated into quartiles. R&D, assets, and sales figures are adjusted for consumer price inflation 
(All  Urban  Consumers-All  Items,  Base  Period  1982-84=100).  The  figures  for  each  firm  are 
calculated as an average over 1989-1991, the three-year period prior to the HSA-related events. 
Therefore, the RDTA figure for each company characterizes its intensity of R&D spending before   15 
the price regulation debate started. The problem of extreme RDS ratios is clear, particularly in 
quartiles 3 and 4. The RDTA ratios are consistently more reasonable. The Appendix also shows 
that not all biotech firms are high R&D-intensive, although most are. All of the generic firms are 
in the lowest RDTA quartile, with the brand-name pharmaceutical firms mostly in quartiles 1 and 
2.  
There are surprisingly few generic firms. Of course, some of the firms that we have 
labeled “pharmaceutical” also produce some generics, but these are few and their primary profit 
generators are brand-name pharmaceuticals. Clearly, investors are willing to fund many R&D-
intensive firms but few generic firms. There are 64 biotech firms; more than ten times the number 
of generics.  
To get a better feel for the data and the sample, consider the descriptive statistics for the 
study variables reported in Table I. Statistics are computed for the full sample and sub-samples of 
firms grouped by R&D-to-asset quartiles. Note that the accounting variables such as R&D and 
Total Assets are measured for each firm with annual data averaged over 1989-1991. The returns-
based variables are measured using daily stock returns. Beta is measured using the market model 
with the CRSP value-weighted index. Beta and return volatility for each firm are measured over 
the pre-event period covering April 24, 1990 to January 10, 1992. The pre-event period directly 
precedes the event period (January 13, 1992 to September 29, 1993), and is selected so that it has 
the same number of trading days as the event period. The event period consists of 434 trading 
days starting five trading days before the first HSA-related event (see Table II), and ends five 
trading days after the last HSA-related event. Beta change (volatility change) is measured as the 
difference between the event period beta (volatility) and the pre-event period beta (volatility). 
Because the large pharmaceutical firms mostly fall into R&D-to-assets quartile 2, that 
quartile has the largest average dollar amount of R&D spending and assets, followed by quartiles 
1, 3, and 4. In deference to the wide variation in firm size, the portfolio returns in the figures 
below are value-weighted.   16 
        [Table I here] 
In the model section, we discussed how R&D is equivalent to a leveraged investment and 
that R&D intensive firms could have relatively large betas. Indeed, the average pre-event betas 
increase across R&D intensity quartiles. Quartile 4 firms are about 50 percent more risky than the 
lowest R&D intensive firms in quartile 1. The difference in average betas between quartiles 1 and 
2  is  statistically  significant  (t-statistic  =  2.08,  not  reported  in  Table  I).  Differences  between 
quartile 1 and the others are more highly significant. Average betas for quartiles 2 and 3 also 
differ (t-statistic = 1.74), but the average betas for quartiles 3 and 4 are not significantly different 
at conventional levels.  
A  similar  monotonic  pattern  is  observed  for  average  pre-event  return  volatilities, 
however, quartiles 1 and 2 (and quartiles 3 and 4) have almost the same average volatilities. Not 
surprisingly,  F-tests  (not  reported  in  Table  I)  of  the  difference  in  average  volatility  between 
quartiles 1 and 2, and between quartiles 3 and 4, show no statistically significant differences. 
However, F-tests show that the average volatilities of the first two quartiles differ from the second 
two quartiles beyond the 1 percent significance level.  
The average beta changes are not statistically different across quartiles, mostly because of 
the relatively large variation in beta changes within each quartile. This could indicate that there is 
large variation in firms’ R&D sensitivity to the HSA within quartile. Nevertheless, it is surprising 
that the first quartile has the largest average increase in beta and the fourth quartile has the 
smallest. The small change in beta for the high-intensity R&D firms that make up quartile 4 can 
be rationalized from our discussion of model (2). These firms have relatively large liquid asset 
weights, which we measure as the ratio of net working capital to total assets. 
Average return volatility does not change much around the HSA, except for quartile 3. 
Furthermore,  the  differences  between  average  quartile  changes  are  statistically  insignificant, 
except  for  the  difference  between  quartile  1  and  quartile  3.  One  surprise  is  that  the  average 
volatility falls for each quartile. The volatility decrease is consistent with the possibility that the   17 
market  expected  price  regulation  to  reduce  future  cash  flow  volatility,  even  while  reducing 
average cash flows. 
The  quartiles  also  do  not  differ  much  with  respect  to  capital  expenditure  intensity, 
measured by the ratio of capital expense to assets. The one exception is that the average capital 
expenditure intensity of quartile 2 is significantly larger than those of the other three quartiles. 
This can be explained by the fact that the second quartile contains many large pharmaceutical 
firms that must spend heavily on production and office facilities. The same pattern appears for 
advertising intensity, where large brand-name pharmaceutical firms must spend to promote their 
products.  
Finally, financial leverage, measured by the ratio of debt to assets, shows that the firms in 
the first two quartiles are more leveraged than the firms in the second two quartiles. Leverage for 
quartile 1 and quartile 2 does not differ significantly. The same is true for quartiles 3 and 4. 
However, differences in average leverage between the first two quartiles and the second two 
quartiles are all significant at the 5 percent level. This reflects the fact that firms in quartiles 1 and 
2 typically have significant cash flows that can be used to service debt. But, overall, none of the 
quartiles show high average leverage. 
 
B. A graphical illustration of the effects of the HSA on firm stock prices 
 To get a general idea of the magnitude of the possible effects of the HSA on our sample 
firms’ stock prices, we present a graphical view of the cumulative total returns one would have 
earned on the stocks in our sample during the period when President Clinton’s healthcare and 
pharmaceutical reform proposals became known to investors.  
Table II lists the major events that we believe were at least partial surprises to investors 
and that can be tied to President Clinton. Ellison and Mullin (2001) provide a more detailed 
description of these events in their chronology of healthcare reform. We include eleven events, 
starting with Clinton’s January 19, 1992 announcement of a vague healthcare plan just prior to   18 
the  New  Hampshire  primary,  and  ending  with  his  official  release  of  the  specific  plan  on 
September 22, 1993. One can argue about which events to include. We searched for significant 
events Ellison and Mullin (2001) might have missed and found none. But they include Clinton’s 
July 16, 1992 acceptance of the Democratic presidential nomination and the October 3, 1993 
presentation of the plan to Congress. Because neither was a surprise, we exclude them. 
We do not exclude events based on realized cumulative abnormal return. For example, 
we  include  Clinton’s  New  York  primary  win  because  we  believe  investors  could  have  been 
surprised by it, even though our 111 stock portfolios increased in value around that event when 
one might have expected a decrease. 
        [Table II here] 
The event period starts January 10, 1992, five trading days before Clinton first announced 
his healthcare reform plan. We include five days before the announcement because there is often 
leakage of news before a formal announcement, especially with regard to political proposals. The 
event period ends on September 29, 1993, five trading days after Clinton publicly announced the 
specific health plan to be sent to Congress. 
Figure 1 shows the raw stock return performance of a value-weighted portfolio of our 111 
sample firms during the full event period. During the period, the portfolio value fell by about 32 
percent while the overall value-weighted market portfolio increased by about 18 percent. We 
know  from  Table  II  that  the  average  sample  firm  is  riskier  than  the  market,  hence, 
underperforming  the  market  by  50  percent  represents  unusually  poor  performance.  After 
adjusting for risk using the market model
5, the value-weighted portfolio of 111 stocks had a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -62 percent during the full event period.  
                                                 
5 The market model is 
  Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit  
where Rit  is firm i’s daily stock return on day t, Rmt is the market return on day t represented by the CRSP 
value-weighted index, αi and βi are ordinary least squares coefficients for firm i, and εit in the error term for 
firm i at time t. The coefficients are estimated over the 255 trading days before the event period and used to 
calculate, Ait, the risk-adjusted return on a particular day t for firm i as,   19 
      [Figure 1 here] 
Table II reports 11-day value-weighted CARs, covering five days before, and five days 
after, each of the eleven major events. The sum of the CARs over the 11 events is -45.50 percent, 
significant at the one percent level after accounting for cross-sectional correlation. Ellison and 
Mullin  (2001)  argue  that  news  about  the  probability  of  price  control  legislation  leaked  out 
gradually over the full period, which could account for the difference between the 11 event CAR 
and the full period CAR (-62 percent). They attribute the negative returns during the full period to 
the effects of the political events leading to the HSA. This may well be the case, especially if one 
views the HSA as the focal point of an emerging political consensus that pharmaceutical prices 
should be constrained either directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, with such a long event period, 
accurately measuring the total effect of the HSA is problematic. 
But our empirical tests do not require an accurate measure of the full effect of the HSA. 
We require a reasonable measure of the relative cross-sectional effects of the HSA on our sample 
of firms. Therefore, we use only the last four events, which are more closely tied to the HSA and 
occur in 1993, when Clinton is president. The sum of the four events’ CARs is 19.01 percent. 
To illustrate the potential relations proposed in our hypotheses, Figure 2 plots value-
weighted CARs for the 111 firms stratified by RDTA into quartiles. Quartile 1 CARs are plotted 
as the first thin line on the graph, quartile 2 CARs are plotted as the first thick line, quartile 3 
CARs are plotted as the second thin line, and quartile 4 CARs are plotted as the second thick line. 
The figure shows that quartiles 1 and 2 experience similar CARs over the period. Quartiles 3 and 
4 start out similar but diverge somewhat later on. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics 
in  Table  II,  which  show  that  these  quartile  pairs  are  comprised  of  firms  with  some  similar 
characteristics.  
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We calculate the compound sum of risk-adjusted daily returns during the event period for each firm, and 
weight that sum by each firm’s total market value as a proportion of the total market value of all 111 firms. 
The risk-adjusted portfolio return is the sum of the 111 weighted returns.    20 
      [Figure 2 here] 
By the end of the event period, CARs in quartiles 1 through 4 are -64.31, -58.49, -75.51, 
and -92.63 percent, respectively. Except for the fact that quartile 2 CARs slightly exceed quartile 
1 CARs, higher R&D intensity is associated with lower CARs across the quartiles. This is a 
simple illustration of the negative relation predicted in hypothesis 1. One reason why quartile 2 
CARs could exceed quartile 1 CARs is given by hypothesis 2. Quartile 2 firms experience an 
average beta increase of 0.09 compared to 0.15 for quartile 1. The larger beta change could 
indicate that quartile 1 firms’ R&D projects were more marginal, and hence, more negatively 
affected by the HSA.  
   
III. Expected R&D Spending Intensity and Statistical Tests 
 
The graphs illustrate the magnitude of the effects that the healthcare reform debate and 
the HSA appeared to have had on pharmaceutical firms’ stock prices. The relatively large effects 
on the most R&D intensive firms are consistent with the HSA’s proposed price restrictions on 
new drugs. This section presents statistical tests of the hypotheses discussed in Section I. Section 
A  models a  pharmaceutical firm’s normal (expected) R&D spending behavior, excluding the 
effects of stock prices. Section B reports hypotheses test results including the relation between 
CAR and firm R&D assets and the relation between firms’ R&D spending and CAR. The potential 
effects of liquidity, self-imposed price constraints, and financial leverage also are considered. 
Section C discusses how the HSA might have indirectly affected firms’ capital expenditure and 
advertising because these items could be complements or substitutes for R&D. The section ends 
with a discussion of the effect of the reaction of firms’ stock prices after the HSA was defeated. 
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A. A model of expected and unexpected R&D intensity 
To  decide  whether  the  HSA  had  a  significant  effect  on  firm-level  pharmaceutical  R&D 
spending  behavior,  we  need  measures  of  expected  R&D  spending  and  unexpected  R&D 
spending.  As  previously  discussed,  we  use  R&D-to-Assets  (RDTA)  as  a  measure  of  R&D 
spending intensity. This standardized measure is better behaved for our sample than R&D-to-
sales, and is more comparable across time and across firms of different sizes, than raw dollars of 
R&D spending. Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique (2004) also use RDTA to identify significant 
R&D changes. Henceforth, we use RDTA and “R&D spending” interchangeably. The HSA may 
not reduce the total dollar amount of R&D spending, but firms may increase spending at a slower 
rate relative to asset growth. RDTA should capture such behavioral changes.  
We follow earlier studies to model expected and unexpected RDTA. Because the HSA did not 
become law, it did not directly reduce firms’ product prices, sales, cash flows, etc. Therefore, 
these  financial  accounting  variables  can  be  used  to  estimate  a  firm’s  expected  RDTA  in  a 
particular  year  in  the  absence  of  the  HSA.  Grabowski  (1968),  Lichtenberg  (2004),  and 
Himmelberg (1994) used sales, cash flows, or assets. Large firms may rely on sales and cash 
flows, but Hall (2002) shows that small firms rely on investor financing. As they raise capital in a 
particular year, their current assets and working capital, and also their R&D, increase in that year. 
Mikkelson  and  Partch  (2003)  document  the  positive  contemporaneous  relation  between  cash 
holdings and R&D expenditures. Therefore, we use the following model that combines these 
major drivers of R&D spending. 
 
RDTAi,t  =  a0  +  ai,1(Salesi,t)  +  ai,2(Assetsi,t)  +  ai,3(Cash  Flowi,t)  +  ai,4(Current  Assetsi,t)  + 
ai,5(Working Capitali,t) + µi,t.                (4) 
 
Regression model (4) relates firm i’s RDTA to its sales, assets, cash flow, current assets, 
and working capital, all measured at time t. The fitted values from the regression measure a firm’s   22 
expected RDTA. Unexpected RDTA (URDTA) for each firm i in year t is measured as the error 
term (µi,t) from (4). The purpose of the model is to get an accurate prediction of R&D based on 
accounting  variables  but  not  stock  price  changes
6.  If  firms  react  to  stock  price  changes  by 
changing RDTA, then this change in behavior should be captured in µi,t.  
We want to capture each firm’s R&D spending behavior around the HSA, therefore, we 
estimate the regression separately for each firm over the years for which it has annual Compustat 
data during 1980-2000. Most firms have at least ten years of data during this period (one firm has 
eight and two have nine years). Only 22 firms have data before 1980 and 25 firms have no data 
after 2000.  
Table III illustrates how these variables were changing for the average firm in our sample 
around the time of the HSA. The variables are in real terms, where dollar figures have been 
adjusted  for  consumer  price  inflation  (All  Urban  Consumers-All  Items,  Base  Period  1982-
84=100). The means of the variables in each year between 1989 and 1996 are presented for the 
full sample and for RDTA quartiles.  
      [Table III here] 
Clearly, the industry experienced strong growth during the period. For the average firm 
between 1989 and 1996, R&D increased from $64 to $108 million, assets increased from $729 to 
$1166 million, sales increased from $712 to $959 million, cash flow increased from $120 to $184 
million, and current assets increased from $381 to $487 million. But working capital actually 
decreased from $165 to $138 million. Somewhat surprising is the negative return on assets in 
each year. This is true for each quartile, with very poor returns for quartiles 3 and 4, which have 
many small, low-revenue firms. Average cash flow is negative in each year for quartiles 3 and 4. 
But these quartiles still have much higher growth in the other variables than quartiles 1 and 2.  
                                                 
6 This model provides relatively good explanatory power. The average R-Squared from this regression for 
the 111 firms in our sample is 0.66.  
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Firms in quartiles 3 and 4 rely heavily on external financing sources to fund R&D. This 
can be seen in the large jump in current assets and working capital from 1990 to 1991 for both 
quartiles. Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) document a large spike in initial public offerings and 
follow-on offerings for biotech firms during this period. They suggest that the subsequent sharp 
drop-off in external financing was due at least partly to the HSA. 
Consider URDTA figures for the full sample and the quartiles. If firms reduced R&D 
spending intensity in response to HSA-related stock prices declines, we should expect to see 
negative URDTA in 1993, or perhaps 1994 or even 1995. For the full sample, average URDTA is 
negative in 1993 but it is positive in 1994 and 1995. But the averages vary by quartile. Quartiles 1 
and 4 have negative average URDTA in 1994 and 1995, but quartiles 2 and 3 have negative 
average  URDTA  in  1993.  This  illustrates  how  the  effect  could  vary  across  different  firms. 
Furthermore, some firms could be positively affected by the HSA and increase their RDTA in 
response. Indeed, 21 of the 111 firms had positive HSA-related CARs.  
The final component required to test our hypotheses is a measure of HSA-related CARs. 
Our approach uses a conservative measure of the HSA effects on stock prices. We consider only 
the four events from Table II that occurred after Clinton became president in 1993
7. The first 
event is the appointment of Hillary Clinton to head the group charged with writing the HSA. She 
was known to be predisposed to pharmaceutical price constraints. The second event is a speech 
by Clinton in which he directly stated that pharmaceutical prices were too high. The third event is 
the New York Times story reporting specific regulations from a leaked preliminary copy of the 
HSA. The fourth event is the formal release of the plan.  
The combined CARs for each firm around these events measures its HSA-related CAR. 
CARs are estimated using the market model, with the CRSP value-weighted index return as the 
market return. The CAR for each event includes five trading days before and five trading days 
                                                 
7 Using CARs measured over all 11 events listed in Table II or the full event period in the empirical models 
produces qualitatively similar results.   24 
after the event. Each firm’s model parameters are estimated over the 255 day trading period 
following the end of the event period (September 29, 1993)
8. The average firm’s HSA-related 
CAR is -17.81 percent.  
 
B. Empirical model test results 
Empirical model (2) tests hypotheses 1 and 2, which posit that HSA-related CAR can be 
explained by the vulnerability of firms’ R&D assets to price regulation. Empirical model (3) tests 
hypothesis 3, which posits that firms reacted to the negative effects of the HSA by reducing their 
R&D spending.  
 
B.1. The relation between HSA-related CARs and firms’ R&D exposures 
Table IV reports the results for the regression tests of the relations between HSA-related 
CAR and pre-event capitalized R&D intensity (CRDTA), pre-event equity beta (βi), beta change 
(∆βi), pre-event volatility (σi), and volatility change (∆σi). The first regression shows that CARs 
and CRDTA are significantly negatively related. This supports hypothesis 1 as well as Figure 2, 
which  showed  that  the  more  R&D-intensive  firms  experienced  larger  negative  HSA-related 
CARs. The regression also shows that both βi and ∆βi are significantly negatively related to CARs 
as predicted by hypothesis 2. Assuming that βi and ∆βi measure R&D leverage, this means that 
firm’s with more  marginal R&D assets experienced larger negative HSA-related returns. For 
example,  the  first  and  fourth  RDTA  quartile  firms  have  average  betas  of  0.99  and  1.49, 
respectively. The -0.20 estimate on βi implies that fourth quartile firms’ stocks declined by 10 
percent more than first quartile firms’ stocks on average, all else equal.  
Finally,  consistent  with  hypothesis  1,  CARs  and  σi  and  ∆σi  are  positively  related, 
although only the relation between CAR and σi is statistically significant. Given that first and 
                                                 
8 We do not use the trading period before the events because this would entail using data from 1992, when 
the other seven events occurred and during which Table I shows that firm betas were changing. Using the 
pre-event period betas give qualitatively similar results, however.   25 
fourth RDTA quartile firms have average σi of 0.035 and 0.051, respectively, the 7.22 estimate on 
σi implies that fourth quartile firms’ stocks declined by about 12 percent less than first quartile 
firms’ stock on average, all else equal. These results imply that the stock price of a firm with a 
1.49 beta and a 0.035 volatility would decline by about 22 percent in response to the HSA, all 
else equal. 
        [Table IV here] 
  As discussed in Section I, subsection B, the relations between CARs and βi, ∆βi, σi and 
∆σi could be affected by the variation in liquid asset intensity across firms. To consider this 
possibility, we interact a liquid asset intensity variable (L) with these variables, and add the 
interaction variables to the regression. L is measured as the ratio of working capital to total assets.  
  The second regression shows that the relations between CAR and βi, ∆βi, σ i and ∆σ i are 
all statistically insignificant after accounting for cross-sectional liquidity differences. But all of 
the estimates on the interacted variables are significant. The negative estimates on (βi x L) and 
(∆βi x L) imply that investors believed that high-liquidity-high-beta (or beta change) firms would 
be most negatively affected by the HSA. Conversely, they believed high-liquidity-high-volatility 
(or volatility change) firms would be least negatively affected or actually positively affected. This 
could simply be because the interacted variables better represent firms’ R&D asset betas and 
volatilities. Alternatively, it could reflect investor concerns about R&D spending by managers in 
the face of potential price constraints.  
These results can be interpreted from a real options perspective. βi and ∆βi (σi and ∆σi) 
measure the potential negative leverage (volatility) effects of the HSA. Those effects are more 
apparent once liquidity is considered. Ample liquidity allows managers of high βi firms to fund 
R&D that investors find unattractive due to the HSA, hence, high-liquidity high-beta firms’ stock 
prices fall considerably. Conversely, a liquidity constraint could actually have a positive effect on 
these  firms’  stocks.  The  reverse  is  true  for  firms  with  high-volatility  R&D  projects,  where   26 
financial slack allows those valuable projects to be funded, even if external financing dries up due 
to the HSA. 
The third regression includes a leverage variable, where firm leverage is measured by the 
ratio  of  total  debt  to  total  assets.  The  estimate  on  leverage  is  statistically  insignificant. 
Furthermore,  none  of  the  other  estimates  change  much.  This  means  that  none  of  the  other 
variables in the regression are picking up the effects of financial leverage as opposed to R&D 
leverage. 
  Finally, the last regression includes a variable to test whether firms that pledged to keep 
price increases low experienced relatively low returns. Twenty-one established firms pledged by 
mid-1993 to keep their drug price increases below the general consumer price inflation. Of the 21 
firms listed in Ellison and Wolfram (2001), ten are part of our sample
9. The price constraint 
dummy (PCDi) variable equals 1 if firm i pledged to keep its price increases below the inflation 
rate, and equals zero otherwise. The point estimate on PCD is negative but it is not statistically 
significant. 
 
B.2. The relation between firms’ subsequent R&D spending and the HSA price threats 
  Hypothesis 3 posits that the HSA’s effects on firms’ stock prices and risks will affect 
their subsequent R&D spending.  Table V reports the regression tests of empirical model (3) for 
the relations between unexpected R&D intensity (URDTA) and CAR, ∆βi, and ∆σi. Because CAR 
is measured in 1993, and managers might not respond immediately by changing current R&D 
budgets, results are presented for 1993, 1994, and 1995. Results for the first three regressions 
show that URDTA and CAR are positively related, although only the 1994 effect is statistically 
                                                 
9 Our sample includes Abbott Labs, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Glaxo, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, 
Pfizer, SmithKline Beecham, Warner-Lamber and Wyeth-Ayerst (American Home Products). The other 
firms are Ciba-Geigy, Dupont-Merck, G.D. Searle, Genentech, Hoechst-Roussel, Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Knoll, Marion Merrell Dow, Syntex, Upjon, and Zeneca. These 11 firms do not have the necessary data.   27 
significant. Given that most firms had negative CARs, this implies that the HSA induced firms to 
cut their R&D intensity in the year following the HSA-related events.  
  URDTA  and  ∆βi  also  are  positively  related,  with  both  the  1993  and  1994  estimates 
statistically significant. But hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relation because, from an options 
perspective, the average increase in βi for the sample firms implies increased R&D leverage, i.e., 
more marginal projects. And Table IV shows that the larger the ∆βi, the greater the decline in a 
firm’s stock price. The optimal response by managers should be to reduce R&D spending. But the 
positive estimate implies that high ∆βi firms actually increased their R&D spending (or decreased 
it less than expected).  
  The weakly-significant positive relation between URDTA and ∆σi for the 1995 regression 
is consistent with our hypothesis. Because σi decreased on average, firms’ R&D option values 
should have decreased, all else equal. In response, managers should reduce R&D spending, which 
is consistent with the positive estimate.  
  The effects of firm liquidity on managers’ R&D spending decisions can help explain 
these mixed results. The fourth regression in Table V shows that firm liquidity had a significant 
effect  on  how  managers  responded  to  the  HSA.  Again,  L  is  interacted  with  the  risk  change 
variables and these new variables are added to the regression. The relations between URDTA and 
∆βi and ∆σi are now insignificant. 
The positive estimate on (∆βi x L) is significant. This implies that high-liquidity-high-
beta-change firms tended to increase R&D spending in response to the HSA rather than decrease 
it as predicted. This could reflect suboptimal behavior on the part of managers of liquid firms 
whose R&D asset values were relatively sensitive to the HSA. The effect is not purely liquidity 
driven  because  if  L  is  included  separately  in  the  regression,  it  is  not  statistically  significant, 
although the point estimate is positive. It is the combination of high-liquidity and high-beta that 
drives the result. Of course, Table IV shows that high-liquidity-high-beta firms also suffered   28 
greater stock price losses. Investors could have expected suboptimal R&D spending behavior 
from liquid high-beta firms, hence, they cut their stock prices. The positive estimate on (∆σi x L) 
is insignificant. 
The last regression in Table V includes the price constraint dummy (PCD) variable to test 
whether firms that pledged to constrain price increases reduced R&D spending relative to the 
other firms in the sample. The PCD estimate is positive but insignificant. But this is because 
pricing  constraints  likely  reduced  these  firms’  sales,  cash  flows,  etc.  Because  (4)  strips  the 
influence of these variables from URDTA, it is not surprising that URDTA and PCD are unrelated. 
A better regression test of whether self-imposed price constraints affected firms’ R&D 
spending uses the predicted values (ERDTA) from (4) instead of URDTA. When we re-estimate 
the last regression in Table V using ERDTA as the dependent variable, the estimate on PCD is 
negative and significant at the five percent level
10. The estimate is also significant if we use 
ERDTA measured in 1993 or 1995. But using 1994 data produces the largest negative estimate. 
This is consistent with Ellison and Wolfram (2001) who show that the firms’ self-imposed price 
restrictions were most evident in their 1994 drug prices.  
  We  also  considered  whether  financial  leverage  had  any  impact  on  the  results.  High-
leverage could have constrained managers’ R&D spending flexibility. We added a total-debt-to-
assets variable to each regression but none of the leverage estimates were significant (not shown). 
This is not surprising given the low debt levels of the sample (see Table I) and results from Table 
IV that show no significant relation between leverage and CAR.  
Finally, we estimate the magnitude of the effect that the HSA had on firm R&D. From 
Table  II,  the  average  firm  experienced  a  -17.81  percent  HSA-related  return.  Given  the  1994 
estimate of 0.09 for the relation between URDTA and CAR, the average firm decreased their 
RDTA by about 0.016 below its expected level. With the average RDTA of about 0.30 in 1994 
(see Table III), this is about a 5.3 percent decline. This is equivalent to about $508 million ($1.02 
                                                 
10 These results are available upon request.   29 
billion) in 1983 (2004) dollars. This probably underestimates the effect because it assumes that 
only 1994 R&D was affected and excludes the effects of self-imposed price constraints. 
 
C. The HSA effects on capital expenditures and advertising 
The HSA apparently affected firms’ R&D spending decisions. Spending on related items 
could also be affected by the HSA if the items are complements or substitutes for R&D. Two 
relevant items are capital expenditure and advertising. We reran the regressions in Table V above 
using  unexpected  capital  expenditure  intensity  (UCAPEXTA)  and  unexpected  advertising 
intensity (UADVTA) in place of URDTA. UCAPEXTA and UADVTA were estimated using the 
same approach as URDTA. Given the limited statistical significance or sample sizes for these 
regressions, we only summarize the results here (available upon request).  
All of the sample firms report capital expenditure in each year so the regression sample 
size is 111 firms. Similar to what we find for URDTA, we find that UCAPEXTA is positively 
related to CAR and ∆βi but the size and statistical significance of the estimates is smaller. This 
makes sense if R&D and CAPEX are weak complements. With lower R&D spending, one would 
expect less need for plant and equipment, but spending on these items is probably less flexible.  
Unlike CAPEX and R&D, firms are not required to report advertising as a separate item, 
consequently, only 51 sample firms report advertising expense. Nevertheless, with the available 
sample we find that UADVTA is negatively related to HSA-related returns. Although statistically 
insignificant unless data for all three years are pooled, the negative relation between UADVTA 
and CAR is intriguing. The results suggest that R&D and advertising are weak substitutes. This 
means that firms may respond to prospective price regulation by reducing R&D and increasing 
advertising. This strategy makes sense because advertising supports currently marketed drugs 
whose  prices  are  already  set,  while  R&D  supports  future  drugs  whose  prices  could  be 
constrained.   30 
Finally, consider Figure 3 which plots the cumulative value-weighted CARs of the stocks 
in each RDTA quartile over a post-HSA period. Like the HSA event period, it includes 434 
trading days, but starts on September 30, 1993 (the day after the HSA event period ends) and 
ends on June 20, 1995. The CARs are based on the market model using the CRSP value-weighted 
index return as the market return. Each firm’s model parameters are estimated over the 255 day 
trading period following June 20, 1995. 
The figure illustrates an interesting dynamic. As Ellison and Mullin (2001) note, the HSA 
lost political momentum shortly after it was released. The figure shows that each quartile of 
stocks rallied as the HSA lost its support, outperforming the market through the beginning of 
February 1994. But by the time Senator Bob Dole pronounced the HSA “dead” on March 2, 
1994, all of the quartiles had lost their gains. 
      [Figure 3 here] 
 By the time Congress officially shelved the HSA on July 21, 1994, a clear dichotomy 
had emerged in the industry. The high R&D intensity quartiles 3 and 4 plunged. Low R&D 
intensity quartile 1 fell to a lesser extent. But quartile 2, that contains most of the brand-name 
firms, regained its losses and started to outperform the market. 
A full explanation of this dichotomy is beyond the scope of this paper. But we conjecture 
that the HSA did indeed have long-term effects on the pharmaceutical industry even though it 
never passed Congress.  Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005) illustrate how the real price of 
pharmaceuticals increased steadily from 1980 through 1992, but remained constant from 1993 
through 1997. Large brand-name firms could fair comparatively well under these conditions as 
they increased advertising to support the value of their marketed drugs. But generic firms relying 
on price competition, and biotech firms relying their R&D project values, could fair poorly. If the 
HSA marked the beginning of implicit pricing limitations, brand names could have become more 
valuable while R&D became less valuable. 
     31 
IV. Conclusion 
 
  Recent research shows that R&D spending creates R&D assets that investors impound 
into stock prices. This study considers whether managers respond to large decreases in stock 
prices (and presumably R&D asset values) by cutting back R&D spending. We use the Clinton 
Administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) as a natural experiment to show that pharmaceutical 
firms, threatened by regulations that would reduce R&D values, cut their R&D spending by about 
five percent ($1 billion in current dollar terms). 
  Events leading up to the formal presentation of the HSA to Congress in late 1993 could 
be  traced  as  far  back  as  the  Democratic  primaries  in  early  1992.  We  show  graphically  that 
pharmaceutical company stocks sustained significant price declines from then until late 1993. The 
average firm experienced a -38 percent return during the period (-62 percent risk-adjusted) while 
the market index earned 18 percent. But relatively R&D intensive firms suffered much larger 
losses on average. After the HSA was defeated in Congress, the industry as a whole rallied for a 
few months, but soon after, the R&D intensive firms again suffered large stock price losses. Only 
brand-name firms enjoyed risk-adjusted gains. 
  Although the HSA appeared to have a substantial negative impact on stock prices, the 
relatively small R&D decrease could reflect the fact that the HSA never became law. Also, many 
R&D leveraged firms happen to have raised much of their capital just before the HSA-related 
events began, hence, they could maintain R&D spending even as their stock prices sank and 
external funding dried up.  
  Finally, we find that firms reduced their capital expenditures in response to stock price 
declines, but the effects are smaller and less statistically significant than for R&D spending. 
Based upon limited data, we find the opposite for advertising spending although the effects are 
usually statistically insignificant. This suggests that some firms may have responded to the HSA   32 
by reallocating resources from R&D to advertising. This strategy supports current products with 
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A firm’s total market value, VT, is composed of its net liquid assets, VL, which are raised 
from investors or generated and retained from past drug sales, the present value of its marketed 
drugs, VD, and the value of its R&D portfolio, VR.  
 
  VT = VL + VD + VR .                (1a)  
 
For simplicity, assume that the firm’s R&D portfolio is a single project, which can be 
described as a call option. If it chooses to, the firm can spend E dollars on R&D and receive a call 
option on the production of a new drug. The value of the project, VR, is 
 
  VR = c(S, σs, X, T, r) – E,              (2a) 
 
where c(•) is a function defining the value of a call option on a new drug with an expected net 
present value of future cash flows of S, a percent volatility for S of σs, and a fixed investment cost 
to build a production plant of X at time T in the future. The risk-free rate of return is r.   
The firm’s expected stock return (ignoring debt) is, 
 
  kT = WL kL + WD kD + WR kR ,              (3a) 
 
where WL = VL/VT , WD = VD/VT , WR = VR/VT, and kL, kD, and kR are the expected returns on liquid 
assets, marketed drug assets, and R&D assets, respectively.    38 
The systematic risk (βT) of the firm is a weighted average of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) betas of the three assets; 
 
  βT = WL βL + WD βD + WR βR .              (4a) 
 
We assume that βL = 0. βD is likely to be smaller than βR because the R&D drug involves a future 
payment  for  fixed  costs  of  production  facilities  and  product  launch.  This  future  payment  is 
equivalent to financial leverage, which increases beta. Assuming that the firm’s capital structure 
is constant over time, then βD < βR. But βD and βR could be similar except that βR is a leveraged 
version  of  βD.  Firms  often  specialize,  developing  and  producing  drugs  in  relatively  narrow 
therapeutic areas. Therefore, both the marketed drug and R&D drug could have similar cash flow 
properties. 
Because the HSA sought to regulate new drug prices, R&D-intensive firms (large WR) 
should be most affected, all else equal
11. But this assumes a homogeneous distribution of R&D 
project characteristics across firms. In reality, some firms will have more marginal R&D projects 
that are more sensitive to the HSA.  
One way to measure a particular firm’s R&D sensitivity is to consider their stock risk and 
volatility from a real options perspective. First, marginal projects can be defined by the difference 
between the R&D asset value and the cost of production facilities, (S – X), that is, how far a 
project is “in-the-money.” (S – X) should be negatively associated with βR. Recall that the level of 
firm βR (and in turn βT) measures its R&D leverage. A firm composed of mostly at-the-money or 
out-of-the-money R&D projects should have a relatively high βT, and be relatively sensitive to the 
                                                 
11 VR and WR probably decline because a call option value declines with the underlying asset’s value (S). S 
declines because expected drug revenues fall assuming inelastic demand (see Coulson and Stuart, 1995), 
while production costs stay constant. A capped price could be less volatile than a free-market price, leading 
to a less volatile underlying asset value. This reduced volatility also decreases the R&D call option value.   39 
effects of the HSA. Conversely, the level of asset volatility, measured by σs, implies larger R&D 
option values and less sensitivity to the HSA, all else equal (see Galai and Masulis (1976)).  
The  changes  in  risk  and  volatility  can  also  help  identify  the  most  sensitive  firms. 
Consider first how βT should change due to the HSA. Using (4a) and denoting the HSA price 

















































.            (5a) 
 
Because βL = 0 and does not change, the first two terms on the right-hand-side of (5a) 
disappear. Similarly, the HSA should have little effect on βD because currently marketed drug 
prices would not be regulated; therefore, the third term disappears. The fourth and sixth terms 
represent the effects on βT when the relative values of the marketed drugs and R&D change. Their 
combined effects on βT are likely to be negative on net. To see this, recall that βR > βD. Because 
the regulation will negatively affect R&D value, but have little effect on the marketed drug’s 
value, the weight on the marketed drug will increase and the weight on R&D will decrease, 














β β . That is, the marketed drug’s (R&D) smaller (larger) beta is 
weighted more (less) so that the firm’s weighted average beta is smaller. 
The fifth term in (5a) represents the HSA’s effect on the risk of R&D. There are two 
relevant effects derived for call options in Galai and Masulis (1976). First, price constraints will 
reduce  R&D  asset  value  (S),  and  this  will  decrease  the  call  value  and  increase  βR.  More 
important, for those firms where (S – X) is small, βR should change the most. That is, the betas of 
the firms with the greatest R&D leverage (more marginal projects) should also have the largest βR 
changes. The value of their R&D projects should fall the most, all else equal, and their R&D 
spending should fall the most (assuming that management responds to stock price changes).   40 
Variation in WL complicates a cross-sectional analysis. Two otherwise identical firms 
with significantly different WL will have different βT changes. The firm with the larger WL will 
have a smaller βT change and stock price change because a larger WL implies a smaller WR, all 
else equal. That is, large liquid asset holdings cushion the effects of the HSA on firm risk and 
stock price. Hence, our analysis controls for cross-sectional variation in WL. 
An analysis of the HSA-induced change in σs proceeds in the same way but has opposite 
implications. If the HSA increases σs, the R&D asset value increases, all else equal. However, 
price regulation, such as that for electric utilities, usually leads to lower but less volatile prices. In 
any case, HSA-induced stock price change and R&D change should be positively related to the 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table I. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables for the Full Sample and By R&D-to-Assets Quartiles.  
 
Each  firm  observation  for  R&D,  R&D-to-Assets,  Total  Assets,  Capital  Expense-to-Assets,  Advertising-to-
Assets, and Debt-to-Assets is measured as an average using annual Compustat data over 1989-1991, the three 
year period preceding the HSA event period. Dollar figures are adjusted for consumer price inflation (All Urban 
Consumers-All Items, Base Period 1982-84=100). Beta and return volatility for each firm is measured using 
daily CRSP returns over the pre-event period covering April 24, 1990 to January 10, 1992. Beta change and 
volatility change are measured as differences between betas and volatilities measured over the event period 
(January 13, 1992 to September 29, 1993) and the pre-event period. The event period consists of 434 trading 
days starting five trading days before the first HSA-related event (see Table II) and ends five trading days after 
the last HSA-related event. The pre-event period consists of the 434 trading days preceding the event period. 
Firms are ranked by R&D-to-Assets and grouped into quartiles. Except for the advertising, the full sample 
includes 111 firms, and quartiles 1, 2, and 4 include 28 firms. Quartile 3 includes 27 firms. For advertising-to-
assets the sample is limited to 51 firms, with quartiles 1, 2, 3, and 4 having 17, 20, 11, and 3 firms, respectively. 
Variable 
 
      Mean        Std. Dev    Variable 
 
      Mean        Std. Dev 
R&D (millions) 





  R&D-to-Assets 





             Quartile 1   47.3005  130.8406                 Quartile 1  0.0393  0.0212 
             Quartile 2  181.3749  242.9518                 Quartile 2  0.1104  0.0303 
             Quartile 3     5.8609     9.6579                 Quartile 3  0.2571  0.0533 
             Quartile 4     4.1176     3.1115                 Quartile 4  0.5910  0.3133 
             
Total Assets (millions) 





  Work Cap.-to-Assets 





             Quartile 1   743.8590  1888.0700                 Quartile 1  0.3324  0.1960 
             Quartile 2  1833.1300  2471.4700                 Quartile 2  0.3669  0.2692 
             Quartile 3      31.7168     63.9066                 Quartile 3  0.6004  0.3100 
             Quartile 4      14.1359     11.0630                 Quartile 4  0.4626  0.3349 
             
Pre-event Period Beta 





  Cap. Exp.-to-Assets 





             Quartile 1  0.9883  0.3281                 Quartile 1  0.0568  0.0599 
             Quartile 2  1.2667  0.5391                 Quartile 2  0.0938  0.0627 
             Quartile 3  1.3697  0.6578                 Quartile 3  0.0521  0.0605 
             Quartile 4  1.4841  0.7584                 Quartile 4  0.0694  0.0643 
             
Beta Change 





  Advert.-to-Assets 





             Quartile 1  0.1527  0.5051                 Quartile 1  0.0534  0.0954 
             Quartile 2  0.0916  0.5454                 Quartile 2  0.0938  0.0627 
             Quartile 3  0.1190  0.7201                 Quartile 3  0.0115  0.0143 
             Quartile 4  0.0388  0.7002                 Quartile 4  0.0132  0.0107 
             
Pre-event Period  
Return Volatility 







  Debt-to-Assets 
 







             Quartile 1  0.0347  0.0138                 Quartile 1  0.2180  0.1527 
             Quartile 2  0.0325  0.0186                 Quartile 2  0.1744  0.1426 
             Quartile 3  0.0500  0.0121                 Quartile 3  0.0900  0.1476 
             Quartile 4  0.0512  0.0127                 Quartile 4  0.1120  0.1280              
Return Volatility Change 





       
             Quartile 1  -0.0001  0.0093         
             Quartile 2  -0.0005  0.0120         
             Quartile 3  -0.0056  0.0108         
             Quartile 4  -0.0014  0.0164         
 
 Table  II.  Value-Weighted  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  for  a  Portfolio  of  111 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Companies 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each of the following events are calculated using the 
market model with the CRSP value-weighted index return as the market return. CARs cover 11 
trading days; five trading days before the event, the event day, and five trading days after the 
event. Each of these events was considered to be a potentially important political event that could 
have made pharmaceutical price controls more likely. HSA-related return, used in the study tests, 
includes only the CARs for the last four events. These events are most closely linked to the HSA 
and occurred after Clinton was elected president. The t-statistic is based on a time series standard 
deviation  of  the  portfolio  mean  abnormal  returns  during  the  market  model  estimation,  as 
suggested in Brown and Warner (1980) to avoid bias from cross-sectional correlation of returns. 




January 19, 1992  Clinton issues health care reform proposals 





       
February 18, 1992  Clinton unexpectedly finishes second in the 





       






       
April 7, 1992  Clinton wins New York primary and becomes 





       
June 4, 1992  Republicans in the House of Representatives 





       
September 24, 1992  Clinton speaks at Merck on health care reform.  -6.31  -3.37* 
       
November 3, 1992  Clinton wins presidential election.  -0.85  -0.45 
       
January 25, 1993  Clinton names Hillary Clinton to head his Health 





       
February 12, 1993  Clinton says drug prices are too high.  -7.70  -4.10** 
       
September 11, 1993  New York Times describes probable regulations 





       






  Total for the 11 events.   -45.50  -5.19* 
       
  Total for the four events in 1993.  -19.01  -8.14* 
 
* (**) Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 1% (10%) level in a one-tailed test. T
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